Description

From a broad macro-financial structure perspective, overly easy credit conditions gave rise to house price booms and busts in several advanced economies (e.g., Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, and the U.S.), and more specifically in the U.S., an underpricing of risk made possible by regulatory arbitrage and shadow financing fuelled the credit and twin real estate bubbles of the mid-2000s. Across countries and over time bubbles have been particularly acute in real estate markets reflecting not only the relatively inelastic supply of land and thin trading of real estate, but also the amplification of shocks via backward-looking price expectations and the funding of consumption off distorted and elevated prices. The macro-prudential lessons from the Great Crisis highlight the need to prevent the build-up of excess real estate financing and limit the amplification and correlation of real estate risks. And progress has been made in each of these areas through imposing tougher or new restrictions on the choice sets of lenders or of borrowers, with particulars varying across advanced economies. Nonetheless challenges remain. Chief among the remaining challenges are assessing whether some aspects of banking are over-regulated, implementing countercyclical Basel rules, ensuring adequate regulation of residential MBS, curbing the build-up of risks in commercial real estate, limiting the possible overuse of mortgage equity withdrawal, and adequately tracking and curtailing risk-taking by shadow banks amid future tightening of restrictions on large commercial banks.

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